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Abstract
We analyze maximal cartel prices in infinitely-repeated oligopoly models under le-
niency where fines are linked to illegal gains, as often outlined in existing antitrust
regulation, and detection probabilities depend on the degree of collusion. We intro-
duce cartel culture that describes how likely cartels persist after each conviction. Our
analysis disentangles the effects of traditional antitrust regulation, leniency, and cartel
strategies. Without rewards to the strictly-first reporter, leniency cannot reduce maxi-
mal cartel prices below those under traditional regulation. Moreover, in order to avoid
adverse effects fine reductions should be moderate in case of multiple reporters. Our
results extend the current literature and partially support existing leniency programs.
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1 Introduction
During the last two decades, antitrust policies in the US and the EC have undergone substan-
tial reforms and currently include leniency programs as a key ingredient, see US Department
of Justice (1993) and EC (2006). Leniency programs grant total or partial immunity from
fines to cartel members collaborating with the antitrust authority (AA) by revealing infor-
mation about the cartel. This revelation may take place ex-ante before any investigation
by the AA starts, or ex-post during an ongoing investigation. Leniency programs are based
upon the economic principle that firms, who broke the law, might report their illegal activi-
ties if given proper incentives. Effective leniency programs might dissolve existing cartels or,
even better, a priori deter such illegal activities. The leniency program in the US reduces the
fines to cartel members, which are related to their illegal gains. Moreover, cartel members
may face liabilities in the form of private law suites by their customers. The EC legislation
has penalty schemes for conviction and leniency that are proportional to illegal gains.
The US Department of Justice reports some empirical evidence in favor of the major
modifications of its leniency program in 1993, see D.O.J. (1998). Despite this evidence,
Spagnolo (2008) asserts that the effects of leniency programs are still not fully understood
theoretically. For example, it is unclear whether the observed increase in cartel detection
cases is the result of unobserved increase in cartel activity or the result of improved effective-
ness of leniency programs. Addressing this issue is one of the main objectives of this paper.
We analyze the effects of leniency programs in an infinitely-repeated sequential game. An
innovative aspect is that we analyze the maximal cartel price, i.e., the largest cartel price for
which the equilibrium conditions for sustainability hold, due to the following considerations.
First, the maximal cartel price represents consumers’ worst-case scenario of maximal dam-
age. Also, it is the relevant proxy for the set of sustainable cartel prices, and it puts a simple
upper bound on the profit-maximizing cartel price. Second, the maximal cartel price adjusts
naturally to policy changes and this is closer to reality where cartels are more likely to lower
prices rather than to give up on collusion altogether. Third, since AAs often have no detailed
information about demand, costs, and profits of firms, AAs’ assessments of market behavior
are, usually, limited to observed prices. The maximal cartel price naturally complements
empirical price assessments by taking society’s maximal damage as its leading principle, i.e.,
provides a simple worst-case scenario. Finally, it avoids some technical problems concerning
monotonicity and concavity associated with profit maximization in our general framework.
Since the profit-maximizing cartel price may coincide with the maximal cartel price, and
the latter price characterizes the set of feasible cartel prices under profit maximization, we
regard both approaches as complementary. The obtained insights are therefore also relevant
for profit maximization.
We explore a convenient technique for analyzing the maximal cartel price in general
oligopoly models. This technique can be illustrated graphically, appeals directly to eco-
nomic intuition, and enhances a more general analysis of sustainable cartel prices than was
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previously possible. We establish monotonicity properties for the maximal cartel price. This
price as a function of the discount factor (or other parameters) exists, but except for some
special cases, lacks a closed-form solution. Our method allows numerical implementation,
which is of utmost importance in applied economics.
The characterization of the maximal cartel price disentangles the effects of traditional
antitrust policies and leniency programs into three separate effects: First, we show that it is
the maximum of two other sustainable prices based upon different behavioral assumptions:
Such price for cartels that operate silently, and for cartels that systematically collude and
report to the AA. Next, the price sustainable by silent cartels is in turn the minimum of
another two sustainable prices: The price sustained under a traditional antitrust policy, and
the one that induces cartel members to be silent. Each of these underlying prices can be
studied separately before being combined to obtain the overall maximal cartel price. The
underlying cartel prices depend upon prevailing policies and the industry characteristics,
such as the industry structure, the type of competition, and the discount factor.
The aim of introducing a leniency program is to reduce the maximal cartel price below the
one under traditional antitrust regulation. Our characterization of the maximal cartel price
shows that, within the class of modified grim-trigger strategies, this is impossible without
rewards to the single (or the strictly-first) reporting firm. In fact, if the leniency program
is wrongly designed, it even may have an adverse effect by enhancing systematic collusion
and reporting that increases the maximal cartel price. We derive necessary and sufficient
conditions under which such adverse effects are eliminated: Individual fine reductions in case
of multiple reporting firms should be moderate.
We also report positive effects of leniency programs. The above impossibility result is
derived under two conditions: Reporting firms do not receive rewards, and a price-deviating
firm is immune for prosecution. Relaxing the latter assumption under traditional antitrust
policies describes current practice in many OECD countries. Then, introducing a leniency
program in which a single reporting firm is granted full immunity and adverse effects are
avoided, is sufficient to reduce the maximal cartel price to the maximal cartel price under
the traditional antitrust policy as if it does not prosecute price-deviating firms. Further-
more, limiting leniency to first-time offenders reduces the adverse effects. These results offer
positive support for current practices in many OECD countries.
Another issue examined by Spagnolo (2004) and Rey (2003) is whether offering rewards
to single reporting firms would be a good regulation policy, or that it would only introduce
adverse effects. To obtain insights, we first characterize the necessary reward to a single
reporting firm that would eradicate all cartel prices above the competitive price. Substantial
rewards to the strictly-first reporting firm achieve this. Next, we analyze the possibility that
the requirement of moderate fine reductions in case of multiple reporting firms allows some
slack for implementing such rewards. If possible, such rewards could reduce the maximal
cartel price below the one under the traditional antitrust policy without introducing adverse
effects. This implies that the EC system can be improved by abolishing the reduced fine
2
for the second reporter, similar to the US, since this would increase the slack available for
introducing rewards.
Our study belongs to a growing literature on the effects of leniency programs in compe-
tition policy. Optimal implementation of antitrust policy and leniency programs for cartel
enforcement have been analyzed in e.g. Motta and Polo (2003), Rey (2003), Spagnolo (2004,
2008), Harrington (2004, 2005, 2008), Hinloopen (2003, 2006), Motchenkova (2004), Buc-
cirossi and Spagnolo (2006), Harrington and Chen (2006), Chen and Rey (2007) and Chen
and Harrington (2007). In the next paragraphs, we relate our study to this literature.
The seminal paper on optimal revelation schemes as part of antitrust policy is Motta
and Polo (2003), who study, loosely speaking, a Stackelberg game in which the AA first
chooses once and for all its antitrust policy followed by the competition phase in which the
firms compete with each other, which is modelled as an infinitely-repeated oligopoly game.
Market competition is restricted to a discrete set of three prices that captures the three
most important profit levels: The profit under perfect competition, under the cartel and
the profit of optimally cheating on the cartel price. In each period, firms decide whether
to reveal information about their misconduct. The cartel adopts grim-trigger strategies
in which cheating on the cartel by either setting a different price or applying for leniency
triggers competitive behavior forever, while the cartel continues collusion as usual each time
it is caught by the AA. Under the optimal antitrust policy, introduction of ex-post leniency
programs will increase the chance of the cartel being captured, but ex-ante leniency programs
that grant reduced fines are ineffective. As later shown in Spagnolo (2004) and Rey (2003),
effective ex-ante leniency programs require substantial rewards, i.e. pay reporting firms.
Chen and Harrington (2007) incorporate ex-ante leniency programs into a special case
of the framework in Harrington (2004 and 2005) to augment traditional antitrust policy in
an environment where cartels arouse suspicions. In such environment, cartels also need to
manage suspicions, modeled as if the cartel keeps in mind an endogenous detection proba-
bility. This probability is modelled as a function of the cartel’s price setting, where price
is a continuous variable. The focus is on an exogenous antitrust policy in order to study
the cartel’s optimal reaction on the profit-maximizing cartel price, which implies that cartel
formation and the cartel’s pricing strategy have become endogenous decisions.
This model can be regarded as the competition phase in Motta and Polo (2003) in a very
general setting. The cartel adopts grim-trigger strategies that are similar to those in Motta
and Polo (2003), but with the difference that the cartel terminates its illegal business after
being caught once by the AA. So, the cartel culture of whether to continue the cartel after
being caught differs between Motta and Polo (2003) and Chen and Harrington (2007). In the
last reference, the detection probability also depends upon past prices and collusive behavior
induces a cumulative liability in the form of fixed fines and private law suites. These two
features introduce state variables into the model and this makes the equilibrium nontractable.
The analysis, therefore, has to resort to simulations of price paths. Nevertheless, the model
admits a steady-state profit-maximizing cartel price that lies above the competitive price,
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and this price is independent of the leniency program meaning such program is ineffective.
The foci of our paper are also detection probabilities and penalty schemes that depend
upon cartel pricing, a topic that receives relative little attention in the literature. However,
such modifications are relevant because these are closer to current antitrust policies. Also,
in our paper cartel formation and its pricing strategy are endogenized by modelling it as the
solution to an optimization program, similar to e.g. Harrington (2004 and 2005). Our model
generalizes Motta and Polo (2003) by including endogenous cartel behavior, the presence of
suspicions, the notion of cartel culture1, and a general class of exogenous antitrust policies
with proportional penalty schemes that include the possibility of an effective reward. Several
aspects of the model in Chen and Harrington (2007) are also generalized, namely a general
oligopoly model instead of Bertrand oligopoly, general penalty schemes with fine reductions
that include rewards, and the notion of cartel culture. In fact, our cartel culture unifies
the opposite assumptions in Motta and Polo (2003) and Chen and Harrington (2007) with
respect to this parameter. Therefore, our model bridges the rudimentary market competition
phase in Motta and Polo (2003) with the general approach in Chen and Harrington (2007).
A major difference is that all references consider profit maximization by the cartel, whereas
we consider the maximal cartel price.
Our analysis is complementary to the analyses in Harrington (2004 and 2005), where the
main focus is on a sufficiently large discount factor under which the equilibrium conditions
will be non-binding. For such large discount factors, they show that the profit-maximizing
cartel price is decreasing in the discount factor. Combining this last result with our results,
namely the profit-maximizing cartel price under binding equilibrium conditions coincides
with the non-decreasing maximal cartel price, implies that the profit-maximizing cartel price
is non-monotonic in the discount factor in case its entire range is considered. Finally, our
results also hint at that the ineffectiveness of ex-ante leniency programs without rewards,
as reported in Chen and Harrington (2007) under large discount factors, generalizes to the
entire range of discount factors.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. In Section 3, we analyze
the effects of traditional antitrust policies and leniency programs on the maximal cartel
price. We discuss the consequences of relaxing some of the main assumptions in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes the analysis and discusses several policy recommendations.
2 The Model
There are n ≥ 2 firms that compete in every of infinitely many periods in the presence of a
leniency program. In each period, the firms first choose their prices, and then decide whether
1Cartel culture in our paper is related to the probability that the cartel resumes business as usual after
each conviction by the AA. By imposing strong assumptions about the underlying stochastic process, Bryant
and Eckard (1991) estimate that 14 per cent of 1300 firms are recidivist. Although our model is fundamentally
different, we treat these estimates as empirical support that the cartel culture belongs to (0, 1) even though
the estimate is for US data prior to the major modifications of 1993.
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to report in case of collusion.2 Therefore, we adopt an infinitely-repeated sequential game,
see e.g. Wen (2002), with a common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) per period and the following
two-stage game in any period: All firms first simultaneously set their prices, and after prices
are observed and profits are realized, all firms simultaneously decide whether to report.
Reporting cannot be kept secret and will be known in the next period, which is called ”the
hard case of public reporting” by Rey (2003). If some firms report, the leniency program is
executed, and otherwise, the AA investigates the market outcome at the end of every period
with certain probability and, upon being caught, violators will be fined. We focus on a class
of modified grim-trigger strategies to sustain cartel prices, in which deviations in either price
setting or self-reporting lead to the competitive equilibrium price in every period thereafter.
The underlying rationale is that any cartel is based upon trust among its members and, trust
is gone after the first deviation. This setup is common in the literature.
Price competition in each period is described by a symmetric Bertrand model with the n
firms, and either homogenous or heterogeneous products.3 Let pi(p1, . . . , pn) be an individual
firm’s per-period profit for prices p1, . . . , pn ∈ R+. Since we mostly deal with symmetric
outcomes, we denote pi(p, . . . , p) ≡ pi(p) for simplicity. Denote the static Nash equilibrium
price and the maximal collusive price by pN and pM , respectively. In every period, the firms
decide whether to collude and if so, to what degree. In other words, all firms choose a price
p = pN + I
(
pM − pN), where I ∈ [0, 1] can be considered as a collusion index. One key
element in analyzing cartel stability is a firm’s profit from unilateral deviation against the
cartel when all the other firms set their prices at p, denoted as piopt (p) = supp′ pi (p
′, p, . . . , p).
We deliberately write supremum instead of the maximum in order to have a well-defined
value function for the discontinuous case of homogeneous products. As in Harrington (2004,
2005), we assume that pi(p) is continuous and strictly increasing in p ∈ [pN , pM ], piopt (p) is
continuous, strictly increasing and piopt (p) > pi(p) > 0 for p ∈ (pN , pM]. Let λ (p) be the
relative size of the net cartel profit to the net gains under the best unilateral deviation:
λ(p) =
{
pi(p)−pi(pN )
piopt(p)−pi(pN ) , for p ∈ (pN , pM ],
1, for p = pN .
As will become clear later, λ (·) represents a degree of cartel stability in the sector. The
higher λ (·), the less incentives each firm has to deviate, and the more stable the cartel is.
The assumptions imply that λ(p) ≤ λ(pN) ≡ 1 is continuous in p ∈ (pN , pM ], but it might
be discontinuous at p = pN , such as the Bertrand model with homogenous products. We
denote4 λ = limε→0+ λ(pN + ε) ≤ 1 and λ = λ(pM).
We impose that λ(p) is non-increasing for all p ∈ (pN , pM ], so that the higher the cartel
price, the higher the incentive of each firm to deviate. This mild assumption captures the
2We adapt the economic definition of a cartel that regards pricing above the competitive (Nash) equilib-
rium price as cartel activity.
3Our analysis immediately applies to quantity competition by making use of the inverse demand function.
4The limit λ is well defined, because the correspondence λˆ(·) that solves λˆ (p) [piopt (p) − pi (pN)] =
pi (p)− pi (pN) for each p ∈ [pN , pM ] is upper semi-continuous for all p ∈ [pN , pM ] and it coincides with the
continuous function λ (·) for all p > pN .
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class of heterogeneous Bertrand duopolies with linear demand and constant marginal costs.
To simplify the exposition, we normalize the static model so that pi(pN) = 0 and from now
on interpret pi (p) as the net profit above the profit pi
(
pN
)
under competition.5
There are two different treatments in the literature of how firms behave after being con-
victed. Harrington (2004) assumes that being caught once is sufficient to deter cartel activity
in the future. In Motta and Polo (2003) the economic sector is notorious for cartel activities
despite many convictions (meaning firms pay the fines and continue illegal business). We
introduce a cartel-culture parameter, denoted γ ∈ [0, 1], that unifies the two different treat-
ments. γ reflects the probability that the firms stop illegal activities after each conviction.
Notorious implies γ = 0, i.e. detection does not dissolve the cartel, while γ = 1 means the
sector becomes competitive after the first detection.
The market outcome is investigated at the end of every period with certain probability
and the antitrust policy is implemented. Upon being caught, violators will be fined.
1. Given p ∈ [pN , pM ], the firms will be found guilty of collusion with probability β(p) ∈
[0, 1). We assume that β(p) ≥ 0 is a non-decreasing differentiable function on p ∈
(pN , pM ] such that limε→0+ β(pN + ε) = β ≥ 0, and β(pN) = 0.
2. If the firms are found guilty of sustaining cartel price p ∈ (pN , pM ], every firm will have
to pay the one-time fine k(p)pi(p), where k(p) ≥ 0 is a non-decreasing differentiable
function on p ∈ (pN , pM ] such that limε→0+ k(pN + ε) = k ≥ 0, and k(pN) = 0.
The function β (·) reflects that a higher cartel price might invoke more attention about
cartel abuse and make detection more likely. Any cartel will take the negative impact of its
cartel price into account when deciding upon the price. Note that β(p) depends on the price
in the current period only. As in Rey (2003), only current period’s misconduct is prosecuted.
The benchmark case of no regulation is captured by β(p)k(p) = 0 for all p ∈ [pN , pM ].
Stylized facts from the OECD countries on antitrust policies, see OECD (2002), suggest
detection probabilities in the range of one out of seven or six and levels of fines in the range
of two to three times the illegal gains from cartel. These facts imply an expected penalty
roughly between 30% to 50% of illegal gains, or 2
7
≤ β (p) k (p) ≤ 1
2
, which are of the same
order of magnitude as estimated in Bryant and Eckard (1991). In this paper, we assume that
0 ≤ β (p) k (p) < 1 for all p ∈ (pN , pM]. This less restrictive assumption implies that the
expected fine at any price above the competitive price is lower than the (per period) cartel
profit and, therefore, any cartel is tempted to set its price above the competitive price.
5Note that for any p ∈ (pN , pM ], we have
λ (p) =
pi(p)− pi(pN )− [pi(pN )− pi(pN )]
piopt (p)− pi(pN )− [pi(pN )− pi(pN )] .
So, it is as if all profits are normalized to net gains above pi(pN ), and it is without loss of generality to
normalize pi(pN ) = 0.
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Rey (2003) pointed to the issue whether to prosecute price-deviating firms. In Section
3, we analyze the simpler case in which price-deviating firms are never prosecuted, as in e.g.
Motta and Polo (2003), and in Section 4.4 such prosecution is incorporated.
The leniency program is modeled as follows. Let α(p, s1, . . . , sn)pi (p) ≤ k (p)pi (p) be an
individual firm’s reduced one-time fine in case the cartel price is p ∈ [pN , pM ] and the firms’
reporting decisions are s1, . . . , sn ∈ {R,N}, where R (N) stands for (Not) Reporting. Since
we mostly deal with symmetric outcomes, we simplify these reduced fines as follows:
1. If none of the firms reports, then the reduced fine α (p,N, . . . , N) pi (p) to a firm in
such a period is equal to its expected fine β (p) k(p)pi (p) from traditional regulation.
2. However, if a single firm reports, the reduced fine in this period to the only reporting
firm is α (p,R,N, . . . , N)pi(p), where we write α (p,N) ≡ α (p,R,N, . . . , N).
3. Finally, if all firms report, then an individual firm pays the reduced fine α (p,R, . . . , R)pi (p),
where we use α (p,R) ≡ α (p,R, . . . , R).
We assume that α(p, s), s ∈ {R,N}, is non-decreasing and continuous in p ∈ (pN , pM ]
such that 0 ≤ α(p,N) ≤ α (p,R) ≤ k(p),6 limε→0+ α(pN + ε, s) = α (s), and α(pN , s) = 0.7
Note that α (p, s) ≥ 0 excludes the possibility that a reporting firm will be rewarded, and we
refer to Section 4.1 for rewards. The US leniency program is captured by α (p,N) = 0 and
the EC leniency program corresponds to 0 ≤ α (p,N) ≤ k(p), where both α (p,N) and k (p)
are constant and α (p,N) can be reinterpreted as a constant percentage of fine reduction.
Chen and Rey (2007) address the issue of limited access to leniency for repeated offenders.
In Section 3, we analyze the case in which the program always allows repeated offenders to
apply for leniency, and in Section 4.3 we discuss the limited access regime. Similar to Rey
(2003), we analyze the issue whether to prosecute price-deviating firms under leniency. In
Section 4.4 we allow for the possibility of prosecution, but we first analyze the simpler case
when such firms are never prosecuted in Section 3.
The equilibrium concept we use is subgame perfect equilibrium and equilibrium conditions
are verified by applying the one-stage deviation principle, see e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991). By the one-stage deviation principle, we only need to consider unilateral deviations
at appropriate histories of either the price setting stage or the reporting stage. To verify
equilibrium conditions, only the expected profits from unilateral one-stage deviations are
required on or off the equilibrium path.
6This ranking captures the rules of the current leniency guidelines in most OECD countries that allow
full amnesty for single self-reporting firms and only partial fine reductions in case of multiple self-reporting.
Non-decreasing reduced fines conforms to the legal reasoning that more severe violations, i.e. higher cartel
prices, are punished harder.
7Although the percentage of fine reductions specified by the current leniency programs in the US and EU
do not depend on the severity of the offense, our model is richer and also includes fines and fine reductions
that vary with the severity of collusion.
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The variable of interest in our study is the socially worst outcome from the consumer
point of view. This outcome coincides with the maximal cartel price sustained by modified
grim trigger strategy profiles. A cartel forms and sets the maximal cartel price whenever the
maximal cartel price is larger than pN . Therefore, the cartel formation and cartel pricing are
both endogenous in our model. Relation of our approach to profit maximization is analyzed
in Section 4.2.
3 Maximal Cartel Prices
In this section, we analyze the maximal cartel price under different modes of regulation and
cartel behavior. Our analysis will show that three specific cartel prices are important: the
highest sustainable cartel price under a traditional antitrust policy, the highest sustainable
price for silently operating cartels under leniency, and such price for cartels that systemat-
ically report under leniency. Therefore, we first derive these three cartel prices in separate
subsections and, finally, analyze the maximal cartel price under leniency in Section 3.4.
3.1 Cartels under Traditional Antitrust Policy
Every cartel has its own destabilizing forces working from within, namely the incentives
of individual firms to cheat on the cartel price. In this subsection, we only consider price
deviations as if no leniency program is present meaning we ignore any decisions to report.
In order to express these destabilizing incentives, it is essential that we describe what
happens within the cartel after some of the firms undercut the cartel price. All firms follow
the modified grim-trigger strategy profile to sustain a cartel price of p > pN that is given by:
1. Firms set a price p > pN in the first period and continue to set price p as long as there
was no (price) deviation. Any deviation by some of the firms leads to 3.
2. As long as there was no deviation, every time the cartel’s fraud p > pN is detected,
with probability 1− γ firms continue under 1. and with probability γ go to 3.
3. All firms set the competitive equilibrium price pN in every period.
Under this strategy profile, let V (p) be the present value of a firm’s expected profit if
the cartel sets price p ∈ [pN , pM] in every period. V (p) is equal to the current illegal net
gains pi (p), minus the expected fine β (p) k (p)pi(p), plus the expected continuation profit of
maintaining the cartel after detection β (p) (1− γ)δV (p), and the expected continuation net
gain of not being detected (1− β (p)) δV (p). Solving for V (p) yields that
V (p) =
1− β (p) k (p)
1− δ [1− γβ (p)]pi (p) . (1)
Note that V
(
pN
)
= 0 due to pi
(
pN
)
= 0. For all p ∈ (pN , pM ], V (p) > 0 because β (p) k (p) <
1. Or, for the opposite case, the cartel would be unprofitable if the AA could set the
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Figure 1: pA ≤ pC is the largest p such that λ (p) ≥ Λ (p).
expected fine above illegal gains. Since β (p) ≥ 0 and k (p) ≥ 0 for all p ∈ (pN , pM ], we have
V (p) ≤ pi(p)/ (1− δ). The upper bound is the benchmark case β (p) = k (p) = 0 that reflects
the case of no regulation.
Given the modified grim-trigger strategy profile, the profit from a unilateral deviation is
equal to the short term net gain piopt (p) in the current period, minus an expected fine of zero
(no prosecution), plus the normalized profit from the competitive equilibrium forever. So,
the necessary and sufficient condition to support cartel price p ∈ (pN , pM] is V (p) ≥ piopt (p):
1− β (p) k (p)
1− δ [1− γβ (p)]pi (p) ≥ pi
opt (p) , (2)
which implies that
λ(p) ≥ Λ(p) ≡ 1− δ [1− γβ (p)]
1− β (p) k (p) , (3)
where Λ (p) is a continuous function on [pN , pM ]. Obviously, p = pN satisfies (3). We
establish several properties of the function Λ (·). We defer all proofs to the appendix.
Lemma 1 Λ(p) is non-decreasing in p and increasing when either β′(p) > 0 or k′(p) > 0.
Moreover, Λ(p) is increasing in γ, k (p) and β (p) and decreasing in δ.
Lemma 1 implies that the right-hand side of (3) increases when γ increases. Hence, a
cartel that is more persistent in its collusion (a lower γ) would weaken (3) and, hence, expands
the range of sustainable cartel prices. Similar, the right-hand side of (3) is decreasing in δ,
meaning that an increase in δ would relax (3). As firms care more about the future, it
becomes easier to sustain a cartel price. More importantly, an overall increase in detection
probabilities β (p) or fines k (p) would make collusion harder to sustain.
The highest cartel price supported by the modified grim-trigger strategy profile under a
traditional antitrust policy (A) is given by
pA = max
p∈[pN ,pM ]
p, s.t. (3). (4)
Program (4) is a well-defined program since p ∈ [pN , pM ] and (3) induces a closed subinterval
of [pN , pM ] that contains pN . This insight follows from Figure 1: First, note that Λ
(
pN
)
=
9
1 − δ and limε→0 λ
(
pN + ε
)
= λ ≤ 1 = λ(pN) implies that p = pN always satisfies (3).
Second, since Λ (p) is non-decreasing and λ (p) is non-increasing, the intersection λ(p) = Λ(p)
is either a unique price or a closed subinterval of [pN , pM ]. Furthermore, if p ∈ (pN , pM ] is any
such price, then all lower prices can also be sustained by the cartel. So, the range of prices
that can be sustained as cartel prices in (3) is a (possible degenerated) closed subinterval of
[pN , pM ] that contains pN . If some intersection point exists, as in Figure 1, the highest cartel
price pA = max {p : λ(p) = Λ(p)} implying pA > pN . Otherwise, pA is equal to either pN
whenever λ < 1 − δ, or pM if λ¯ ≥ Λ(pM). The intuition is that higher cartel prices put an
upward pressure on the right-hand side of (3). This reduces the sustainability of p and only
sectors with values of λ (p) relatively close to 1 might withstand this pressure, meaning the
short-term gains of blowing up the cartel must be close enough to the cartel profit pi (p).
In what follows, we are also interested in the effectiveness of antitrust regulation (and
later leniency programs) compared to the benchmark case β (p) = k (p) = 0 of no regulation.
Then, the Λ function becomes the constant function Λ (p) = 1− δ and Program (4) specifies
the special case of the highest collusive price (C) in the absence of regulation:
pC = max
p∈[pN ,pM ]
p, s.t. λ (p) ≥ 1− δ, (5)
Figure 1 also illustrates pC . Note that Λ(p) ≥ 1− δ for all p ∈ [pN , pM] implies that any p
that satisfies (3) also satisfies the constraint in (5). Comparing (4) and (5), we observe that
regulation may reduce the highest cartel price: pN ≤ pA ≤ pC ≤ pM .
Now, we explain how we characterize highest cartel prices. A direct approach would be
to solve (3) for p as a function of all parameters. However, it is not clear how to solve (3).
Instead, our characterization is based upon analyzing properties of the threshold level for δ
as a function of p ∈ [pN , pM ] in the (p, δ)-space, and then, translate these properties to the
highest cartel price as a function of δ in the (δ, p)-plane.
To be more specific, rewriting (3) yields the threshold on the discount factor δ for sus-
taining the arbitrary cartel price p ∈ (pN , pM ];
δ ≥ ∆(p) ≡ 1− λ(p) [1− β (p) k (p)]
1− γβ (p) . (6)
We establish the following properties of the function ∆ (·).
Lemma 2 ∆(p) is continuous and non-decreasing in p ∈ (pN , pM ], ∆(p) ≥ 1 − λ(p) (with
strict inequality when β (p) > 0) and increasing in k (p) and β (p).
The monotonicity property with respect to p implies that taking the inverse relation-
ship of (6) for values of δ ∈ [∆(pN),∆(pM)] is well-defined and would in principle yield
pA = ∆−1 (δ). Since the function ∆ (p) is a nontrivial function of p, taking this inverse is
practically impossible except for specific functional forms such as Example 5 at the end of
this subsection. The following result states general properties of the curve pA = ∆−1 (δ).
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Proposition 3 Under any antitrust regulation, the highest cartel price pA is non-decreasing
in δ ∈ (0, 1) and non-increasing in γ ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore, we have
pA = pN , for δ ∈ (0, 1− λ),
pA ∈ [pN , pM), for δ ∈ [1− λ,∆(pM)),
pA = pM , for δ ∈ [∆(pM), 1),
An overall increase in detection β (p) or k (p) shifts ∆(pM) and the entire curve to the right.
As is demonstrated by Example 5, the first range must be open and the middle range can
be empty. For comparison, inserting β (p) = k (p) = 0 in the function ∆ (·) yields
pC = pN , for δ ∈ (0, 1− λ),
pC ∈ [pN , pM), for δ ∈ [1− λ, 1− λ),
pC = pM , for δ ∈ [1− λ, 1).
Since Proposition 3 also implies that 0 < 1 − λ ≤ 1 − λ ≤ ∆(pM), antitrust regulation
with positive expected fines restricts the set of discount factors for which collusion can be
sustained at a given p ∈ (pN , pM ]. In other words, antitrust regulation reduces the highest
sustainable cartel price. Combining all inequalities implies:
Corollary 4 Depending on the discount factor δ, the effectiveness of regulation is given by
pN = pA = pC = pN , if δ ∈ (0, 1− λ),
pN < pA < pC < pM , if δ ∈ [1− λ, 1− λ),
pN < pA < pC = pM , if δ ∈ [1− λ,∆(pM)),
pM = pA = pC = pM , if δ ∈ [∆(pM), 1).
When δ ∈ [∆(pM), 1), the antitrust policy is not effective to deter the cartel from setting
its monopoly price, i.e. pA = pM , when interval δ ∈ [∆(pM), 1) is non-empty. This implies
that the necessary and sufficient condition for pA = pM is ∆(pM) < 1. By (6), ∆(pM) < 1
requires that condition (3) for cartel stability is broken at δ = 1, i.e.
λ(pM)
γ
>
β
(
pM
)
1− β (pM) k (pM) . (7)
This inequality is written to separate the sector characteristics (γ, λ (p)) from the policy
instruments (β (p) , k (p)). In economic applications, (7) can be easily verified numerically
by calibrating sector characteristics in order to obtain thresholds for policy parameters.
Given a particular antitrust policy, it is interesting to investigate whether this policy can
eradicate the monopoly price for all cartel cultures. Solving condition (7) for γ yields
γ <
λ
(
pM
) [
1− k(pM)β(pM)]
β(pM)
To destabilize cartels for all possible cartel cultures γ ∈ [0, 1], the right-hand side must
be negative, i.e. β(pM)k(pM) > 1. Hence, under any cartel policy that satisfies condition
0 < β(p)k(p) < 1 for all p ∈ (pN , pM ], sectors that are notorious for persistent cartel behavior
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Figure 2: Two cases for the curve of pA in Example 5.
(γ close to 0) cannot be eradicated by the antitrust policy unless one is willing to adopt a
policy that fully takes away the illegal gains, i.e. k(p)β(p) > 1 for all p ∈ (pN , pM ].
Another important conclusion is related to the impact of the level of the function λ (·)
on sustainability of the monopoly price. Recall the definition of λ (·), through (3) cartel
stability is related to a particular sector characteristic. Condition (7) relaxes for sectors
were the degree of cartel stability is higher, i.e. λˆ(·) > λ (·) for all p ∈ (pN , pM ], and this
makes sustaining higher cartel prices possible. Also, the function ∆ (p) shifts downward in
sectors with a higher cartel stability λˆ(·). So that in these sectors, we should expect that
regulation will be less effective compared to sectors with lower λ(·).
The main message of this section is a mixed blessing for antitrust regulation. On the
one hand, Corollary 4 identifies non-empty sets of parameter values for which antitrust
regulation is effective in reducing the highest cartel price. On the other hand, as long as the
legal system obeys condition (7), there always will be a non-empty set of parameter values
for which pA = pM , meaning the antitrust policy is totally ineffective on this set.
In general, it is impossible to obtain a closed-form solution for pA = ∆−1 (δ) for δ ∈
[1 − λ,∆(pM)). In economic applications, however, one can resort to a simple numerical
implementation of our approach: Numerically calculate the monotonic values of ∆(p) in the
(p, δ)-space and, then, by reversing the dependence, plot the numerical values in the (δ, p)-
space for δ ∈ [1−λ,∆(pM)) to obtain pA = ∆−1 (δ). For all other values of δ, pA is either pN
or pM . In some cases, closed-form solutions can be derived as our next example illustrates.
Example 5 Consider a homogeneous Bertrand oligopoly model with linear demand y = 2−p
and constant marginal costs of 0. The antitrust regulation is given by β (p) = βp and
k (p) = k, where kβ < 1. Note that pN = 0, pM = 1, and piopt (p) = npi (p) for all
p ∈ (pN , pM ]. Consequently, λ (pN) = 1 and λ(p) = 1
n
for all p ∈ (pN , pM ] is a discontinuous
function with λ = λ = 1
n
. Program (4) becomes
pA = max
p∈[0,1]
p, s.t.
1
n
≥ 1− δ + γδβp
1− kβp .
Note that p = pN = 0 is feasible in the constraint if and only if δ ≥ 1 − 1
n
= 1 − λ. The
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constraint can be rewritten as
p ≤ 1− n(1− δ)
(nγδ + k)β
and the upper bound is the solution pA whenever it is between 0 and 1. The right hand side
is increasing in δ, and decreasing in γ, β and k. To summarize, we have
pA =

0, for δ ∈ (0, 1− 1
n
),
1−n(1−δ)
(nγδ+k)β
, for δ ∈ [1− 1
n
, n−(1−βk)
n(1−γβ) ),
1, for δ ∈ [n−(1−βk)
n(1−γβ) , 1),
where application of Proposition 3 yields the intervals for δ. Note that β = k = 0, i.e. no
antitrust regulation, implies the third interval is equal to [1− 1
n
, 1) and, therefore, pC = 1 for
all δ ∈ [1 − 1
n
, 1). Note that the third interval is empty if and only if (nγ + k)β ≥ 1. Since
βk < 1, this condition can hold only when nγ is sufficiently large. Then, pA is less than
pM = 1 for all δ ∈ (0, 1). For sectors with a small number of firms and a persistent cartel
culture (γ close to 0), the monopoly price will not be eradicated. The two mutually exclusive
cases for the curve of highest prices pA are illustrated by Figure 2, where the vertical dotted
line at δ = 1− 1
n
represents the discontinuous jump of pC from pN = 0 to pM = 1.
3.2 Silent Cartels under Leniency
Since traditional antitrust policy alone may not be sufficient to eradicate all cartel prices,
such policies in OECD countries are augmented with leniency programs. In this section, we
analyze leniency programs under modified grim-trigger strategy profiles in which firms never
report, meaning cartels operate silently.
All firms follow the modified grim-trigger strategy profile to sustain a cartel price of
p > pN that is given by:
1. Firms set a price p > pN and do not report in the first period and continue to do so
as long as there was no deviation. Any deviation by some of the firms leads to 4.
2. As long as there was no deviation, every time the cartel’s fraud p > pN is detected,
with probability 1− γ firms continue under 1. and with probability γ go to 4.
3. A price-deviating firm does not report in the period of deviation.
4. All firms set the competitive equilibrium price pN and keep silent in every period.
Note, that the cartel breaks down if a firm either undercuts the cartel price or reports.8
Given this strategy profile, the present value of an individual firm’s expected profits is equal
to V (p) in (1) for the same reasons.
8Under the alternative assumption that reporting will not lead to a breakdown of the cartel, the interval
of sustainable prices shrinks. To see this, modifying this section’s arguments implies (8) below becomes
1 − α (p,N) ≤ 1−δΛ(p) , and any p satisfying this condition also satisfies (8), but not vise versa. Since we
concentrate on the maximal cartel price, we do not further discuss this alternative assumption.
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In this modified grim-trigger strategies, there are two types of unilateral one-stage devia-
tions: undercut the cartel price and report to the AA. Furthermore, there are three relevant
histories, two on the equilibrium path and one off the equilibrium path just after a unilateral
price deviation. Under the assumption that a price-deviating firm is never fined, it has no
incentive to seek protection from fines after any history following its own deviation and,
therefore, refraining from reporting is optimal in this subgame. Next, on the equilibrium
path, inequality (3) is still the necessary and sufficient condition under which no firm would
undercut the cartel price.
We now consider refraining from reporting on the equilibrium path. The expected con-
tinuation profit of the one-stage deviation by reporting consists of paying the reduced fine
α (p,N)pi(p) in the current period followed by the continuation profits from the competitive
equilibrium price pN forever after. Therefore, a firm will not report if and only if
−α (p,N)pi(p) ≤ β(p) [−k(p)pi(p) + δ(1− γ)V (p)] + [1− β(p)] δV (p) = V (p)− pi (p) ,
which simplifies to
1− α (p,N) ≤ V (p)
pi(p)
=
1
Λ(p)
. (8)
Condition (8) implies that, in order to break the silence of no reporting, the fine reduction
should be sufficiently low, i.e. α (p,N) ≤ k (p). Since Λ (p) ≥ 0, any leniency program that
offers a reduced fine of α (p,N) ≥ 1, i.e. the reduced fine is higher than a single period’s
profit, trivially satisfies (8) and fails to be effective. Therefore, it is without loss of generality
to consider 0 ≤ α (p,N) < 1 for all p ∈ [pN , pM ]. Then, (8) can be rewritten as
1
1− α (p,N) ≥ Λ(p). (9)
Since α (p,N) is non-decreasing in p, we have the following result.
Lemma 6 1
1−α(p,N) is non-decreasing in p and increasing when α (p,N) is increasing in p.
Moreover, limε→0 11−α(pN+ε,N) =
1
1−α(N) ≥ 1 = 11−α(pN ,N) .
Lemma 1 and 6 imply that the functions on both sides of (9) are non-decreasing in p.
Therefore, these functions may cross more than once.
Under a leniency program, the highest cartel price for a silent cartel (S) is given by
pS = max
p∈[pN ,pM ]
p, s.t. (3) and (9). (10)
Program (10) is a well-defined program. This result follows from Figure 3: First, p = pN
always satisfies (9) due to Λ
(
pN
)
= 1 − δ and limε→0 11−α(pN+ε,N) ≥ 1. Then by the results
in Section 3.1, p = pN satisfies both constraints in (10). Next, although Λ (p) and 1
1−α(p,N)
might have multiple crossings, continuity of both functions implies that the set of prices such
that (9) holds is the union of possibly degenerated non-empty and compact subintervals of
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Figure 3: The price p˜ is the smallest p such that 1
1−α(p,N) = Λ (p). And p˜ ≥ pA.
[pN , pM ]. Taking the intersection of the union of subintervals with the subinterval implied
by (3) preserves the last property on a subset of the subinterval
[
pN , pA
]
. Combining these
facts, implies that Program (10) induces a well-defined highest price on
[
pN , pM
]
.
For our analysis, let p˜ ∈ (pN , pM ] be the smallest intersection point p such that 1
1−α(p,N) =
Λ(p), then all lower prices satisfy (9). So, the cartel can keep secret the range of prices[
pN , p˜
]
. It is without loss of generality to treat p˜ as the highest cartel price that can be
sustained by (9). To see this, both p˜ and pA are intersections of some curve with the curve
Λ (·). By assumption, 1
1−α(p,N) ≥ 1 for all p ∈ [pN , pM ], and by definition, λ (p) ≤ 1 for
all p ∈ [pN , pM ] implies λ (p) ≤ 1 ≤ 1
1−α(p,N) for all p ∈ [pN , pM ]. Since Λ
(
pN
)
< 1 and
Λ (·) is non-decreasing, the curve Λ (·) must first intersect λ (·) before it intersects the curve
1
1−α(·,N) , as illustrated by Figure 3. Hence, p
A ≤ p˜. Or, (3) is always binding in Program
(10), whereas (9) is never binding and can therefore be disregarded. Hence, we have:
Proposition 7 Under (ex-ante) leniency programs and modified grim-trigger strategy pro-
files in which firms operate silently, we have pS = pA.
The implication of Proposition 7 is that if the cartel can sustain the cartel price p ∈[
pN , pA
]
under traditional regulation, then introducing an leniency program without rewards
allows the cartel to maintain its illegal activity with the same cartel price by operating
silently. So, the introduction of such a program to existing antitrust regulation is not effective
in reducing cartel prices. Proposition 7 confirms the findings in Motta and Polo (2003),
Spagnolo (2004) and Rey (2003) and extends these to our generalized setting. Treating the
cartel price as a continuous variable allows to employ a more powerful technique and derive
richer results. Given the low expected fines implied by the current policies of most OECD
countries, i.e. β (p) k (p) < 1, we obtain that any fine reduction for the first-reporting firm
under a leniency program (when rewards are not allowed) would not be sufficient neither to
reduce the existing cartel price p ∈ (pN , pA], nor to block cartel formation.
3.3 Systematically Reporting Cartels under Leniency
Spagnolo (2004) argues that cartels may collude and apply for leniency every period as part of
the collusive agreement. This behavior may reduce fines below expected fines from operating
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silently. Such behavior is observed in experiments by Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008) with
pricing below the monopoly price. In this section, we analyze modified grim-trigger strategy
profiles in which firms systematically collude and report in every period.
All firms follow the modified grim-trigger strategy profile to sustain a cartel price of
p > pN that is given by:
1. Firms set a price p > pN and report in the first period and continue to do so as long
as there was no price deviation. Any price deviation by some of the firms leads to 3.
2. A price-deviating firm does not report in the period of deviation.
3. All firms set the competitive equilibrium price pN and keep silent in every period.
Note that the cartel breaks down after a firm undercuts the cartel price, but not if a firm
refrains from reporting. For p ∈ [pN , pM], this strategy profile induces a present value equal
to [1− α (p,R)]pi (p) / (1− δ).
As in Section 3.2, there are two types of deviations and three relevant histories. A firm
that refrains from reporting after all firms set p ∈ (pN , pM] will have to pay a higher fine,
which hurts in the current period while it does not cause the cartel to break down. So,
reporting after setting cartel price p ∈ (pN , pM] is trivially optimal. Similar as in Section
3.2, since a price-deviating firm is never fined, such firm has no incentive to report after his
own price deviation. So, both conditions can be ignored and only unilateral price deviations
on the equilibrium path matter. A firm does not set a deviating price if and only if
1− α (p,R)
1− δ pi (p) ≥ pi
opt (p) .
Since α (p,R) < 1 is necessary for this condition to hold, it can be rewritten as
λ (p) ≥ 1− δ
1− α (p,R) > 0. (11)
Since α (p,R) is non-decreasing, the following properties hold.
Lemma 8 1−δ
1−α(p,R) is non-decreasing in p, increasing in p when α (p,R) is increasing in p,
and decreasing in δ. Finally, limε→0 1−δ1−α(pN+ε,R) =
1−δ
1−α(R) ≥ 1− δ = 1−δ1−α(pN ,R) .
Lemma 8 implies that both functions in (11) have opposite weak monotonicity properties,
which is similar to (3). Furthermore, the right-hand side of (11) decreases in δ, meaning
that an increase in δ would relax (11), and it becomes easier to sustain a collusive price.
Under leniency, the highest cartel price of always colluding and reporting (R) is given by
pR = max
p∈[pN ,pM ]
p, s.t. (11). (12)
For reasons similar to Section 3.1, (12) is a well-defined program since p ∈ [pN , pM ] and
(11) induces a closed subinterval of [pN , pM ] that contains pN , where the latter follows from
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Figure 4: The maximal cartel price pR is the largest p such that 1−δ
1−α(p,R) ≥ λ (p).
1−δ
1−α(pN ,R) = 1−δ < 1 = λ(pN). If some intersection point of (11) exists, as Figure 4 illustrates,
the highest cartel price pR =
{
max p : λ(p) = 1−δ
1−α(p,R)
}
implying pR > pN . Otherwise, pR
is equal to either pN whenever λ < 1 − δ, or pM if λ¯ ≥ 1−δ
1−α(pM ,R) . The intuition is that
higher cartel prices put an upward pressure on the right-hand side of (11). This reduces the
sustainability of p and only sectors with values of λ (p) relatively close to 1 might withstand
this pressure. Since the right-hand side of (11) is at least 1 − δ, comparing (5) and (12)
implies: pN ≤ pR ≤ pC ≤ pM .
Similar to Section 3.1, we characterize the highest cartel price pR. Rewriting (11) yields
the threshold on the discount factor for sustaining the arbitrary cartel price p ∈ [pN , pM ];
δ ≥ Φ (p) ≡ 1− λ (p) [1− α (p,R)] . (13)
Lemma 9 Φ (p) is continuous and non-decreasing in p ∈ (pN , pM ], and Φ (p) ≥ 1− λ(p) is
increasing in α (p,R).
Lemma 9 implies a higher threshold for δ when compared to the benchmark 1− λ (p).
The monotonicity property with respect to p implies that taking the inverse relationship
of (13) for values δ ∈ [Φ (pN) ,Φ (pM)] is well-defined and yields pR = Φ−1 (δ). For reasons
similar to Section 3.1, a closed-form solution for this inverse only exists for specific functional
forms. Therefore, our next result states general properties of the curve pR = Φ−1 (δ).
Proposition 10 The highest cartel price pR is non-decreasing in δ ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore,
pR = pN , for δ ∈ (0, 1− λ),
pR ∈ [pN , pM), for δ ∈ [1− λ,Φ(pM)),
pR = pM , for δ ∈ [Φ(pM), 1),
where Φ(pM) < 1.
To conclude this subsection, we characterize pairs in the (p, α)-space consisting of a
cartel price p and a reduced fine α (p,R) such that the strategy profile with cartel price p
and reporting form an equilibrium. To do so, we rewrite (11) as
α (p,R) ≤ 1− 1− δ
λ (p)
. (14)
We establish the following result.
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Figure 5: Systematic reporting is sustainable if p and α (p,R) belong to region A.
Lemma 11 1− 1−δ
λ(p)
is non-increasing in p, decreasing in p when λ (p) is decreasing, increas-
ing in δ, and has image [0, 1− 1−δ
λ
] ⊂ [0, δ] if and only if p ∈ [pN , pC].
Condition (14) implies two regions, called A and B, as illustrated in Figure 5 under
α (p,N) = 0 for explanatory reasons.9 For any pair p and α (p,R) in region A, condition
(14) holds and the strategy profile with systematic collusion on cartel price p and reporting
forms an equilibrium. So, if the curve α (p,R) crosses region A, then pR ∈ (pN , pC ] and
systematic collusion and reporting occurs. In region B, condition (14) does not hold and
such profile cannot form an equilibrium.
Hence, systematic collusion and reporting cartel sustains price p if and only if p and
α (p,R) belong to region A. Since upper bound (14) on the fine reduction is non-negative,
there always exists a range of substantial fine reductions (without rewards) marked by region
A where leniency programs provide sufficient incentives for reporting. But this is also the
region where we observe, so-called, adverse effects of leniency in the sense that reporting
becomes a part of the collusive agreement without dissolving the cartel.
Cartels do dissolve whenever the curve α (·, R) runs entirely through region B. Then,
any p ∈ (pN , pM ] fails (14) and pR = pN . In other words, whenever α (p,R) > 1 − 1−δ
λ(p)
for
all p ∈ (pN , pM ], then equilibria in strategy profiles with systematic collusion and reporting
are ruled out. Moreover, the cartel dissolves due to price-deviations. This implies that the
regulator can eliminate the adverse effects of leniency programs and prevent cartel formation.
For that the design of leniency guidelines should avoid substantial fine reductions α (p,R) in
case of multiple reporting, i.e. such fine reductions should at most be moderate.
The next example illustrates that in some cases closed-form solutions can be derived.
Example 12 Consider once more the homogeneous Bertrand oligopoly model of Example 5
and the linear reduced-fine function α (p,R) = αp, where α ∈ [0, 1) satisfies α (p,R) < 1 for
all p ∈ [pN , pM ]. Program (12) becomes
pR = max
p∈[0,1]
p, s.t.
1
n
≥ 1− δ
1− αp
9Since α (p,R) ≥ α (p,N), the non-decreasing curve α (p,N) ≥ 0 also puts a lower bound on region A,
which is not drawn.
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Figure 6: The curve of the maximal cartel price pR in Example 12.
Note that p = pN = 0 is feasible in the constraint if and only if δ ≥ 1− 1
n
= 1−λ. Proceeding
similar as in Example 5, we rewrite the constraint as p ≤ [1− n (1− δ)] /α, and obtain
pR =

0, for δ ∈ (0, 1− 1
n
),
1−n(1−δ)
α
, for δ ∈ [1− 1
n
, 1− 1
n
[1− α]),
1, for δ ∈ [1− 1
n
[1− α] , 1),
where application of Proposition 10 yields the intervals for δ. Since 1 − 1
n
(1− α) < 1, the
monopoly price will not be eradicated if firms are sufficiently patient. For δ ∈ [1 − 1
n
, 1),
the curve in Figure 5 is the constant function 1 − n (1− δ) ≥ 0 implying pC = pM = 1 and
region A is a rectangle. Figure 6 illustrates the highest cartel price as a function of δ.
3.4 The Maximal Cartel Price under Leniency
In this section, we characterize the maximal cartel price for the entire class of grim-trigger
strategy profiles, which consists of the union of those studied in Section 3.2 and 3.3.10
Firms follow a modified grim-trigger strategy profile that serves the cartel’s purpose of
supporting cartel prices. In some cases, it is just one type of the strategy profiles considered
in Section 3.2 and 3.3 that serves this goal, in other cases, both types do. In the latter case,
we investigate whether the leniency program is exploitable. Since prices are implicit in the
definition proposed in Spagnolo (2004), we extend his definition and call a leniency program
exploitable at cartel price p whenever both strategy profiles of Section 3.2 and 3.3 support
p as an equilibrium price and 1−α(p,R)
1−δ pi (p) > V (p).
The maximal cartel price is defined as the maximal cartel price subject to the appropriate
equilibrium conditions. These are either the equilibrium conditions (3) and (9) in Section
3.2, or (11) in Section 3.3. Formally, the maximum cartel price under leniency (L) for the
entire class of grim-trigger strategy profiles is given by
pL = max
p∈[pN ,pM ]
p, s.t. either (3) and (9), or (11). (15)
10Obviously, the union also includes the modified grim-trigger strategy profiles discussed in Footnote 8.
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Figure 7: The maximal cartel price pL is the maximum of pA and pR.
By our previous results, the conditions can be translated into two intervals of sustainable
cartel prices, i.e., either p ∈ [pN , pS] or p ∈ [pN , pR], and therefore the constraints in (15) are
equivalent to
[
pN , pS
] ∪ [pN , pR] = [pN ,max{pS, pR}]. Since also pS = pA by Proposition
7, the following result is immediate.
Proposition 13 Under (ex-ante) leniency programs and modified grim-trigger strategy pro-
files, we have pL = max
{
pS, pR
} ≥ pA.
The implication of Proposition 13 is negative: Given that we consider arbitrary policy
functions β (p) and k (p) such that β (p) k (p) < 1, it is impossible to find a policy function
α (p,R) ≥ 0 that will reduce the range of sustainable cartel prices to a strict subinterval of[
pN , pA
]
. To the contrary, introducing a leniency program to existing antitrust regulation
may even enhance cartels by allowing them to sustain higher prices. At best, the leniency
program achieves pL = pA and, at worst, it achieves pL > pA. If pL = pA, then the maximal
cartel price can be supported by a strategy profile in which the cartel operates silently and
the leniency program fails to break this price and the silence. Observing silence is evidence
of pL = pA. Otherwise, i.e. pL > pA, the maximal cartel price cannot be sustained under
traditional regulation, but it can be sustained by a strategy profile in which the cartel
systematically colludes and reports to the AA. In this case, observing reporting is evidence
of an increased range of sustainable cartel prices!
The necessary and sufficient conditions for pL = pR > pA are somewhat involved. For
explanatory reasons, consider Figure 7. It illustrates the case in which pR > pA is associated
with a unique crossing of the curves Λ (·) and λ (·) at a lower cartel price than the unique
crossing at some higher price of the curves 1−δ
1−α(·,R) and λ (·). So, the curve Λ (·) at p = pA lies
above the curve 1−δ
1−α(·,R) at p = p
A and this suffices for pL = pR > pA. To put it differently,
pA and α
(
pA, R
)
belong to Figure 5’s region A, but not to this region’s upper boundary.
However, since intersections of these curves may involve horizontal line pieces it may also be
the case that all three curves have line pieces that partly overlap and if the curve Λ (p) starts
increasing at p = pA while the other two curves remain horizontal for p in some non-empty
interval (pA, pA + ε¯], for some ε¯ > 0, then pL = pR ≥ pA + ε¯ > pA. The next lemma states
the necessary and sufficient conditions for pL > pA.
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Proposition 14 pL > pA if and only if either i) α
(
pA, R
)
< 1 − 1−δ
λ(pA)
, or ii) α
(
pA, R
)
=
1− 1−δ
λ(pA)
= 1− 1−δ
Λ(pA)
, and there exists some ε¯ > 0 such that both λ (·) and 1−δ
1−α(·,R) are constant
on [pA, pA + ε¯] and Λ (·) is strictly increasing on (pA, pA + ε¯].
Proposition 14 states conditions under which the maximal cartel price increases due
to leniency. In short, if the fine reductions for multiple reporting firms are too generous,
introducing a leniency program increases the maximal cartel price instead of reducing it.
In order to avoid this type of adverse effects, fine reductions should be limited such that
α
(
pA, R
)
> 1 − (1− δ) /λ (pA). So, moderate fine reductions in case of multiple reporting
firms not only allow to avoid the systematic collusion and reporting strategy profile of Section
3.3, but also prevents that introduction of leniency will increase the maximal cartel price.
Next, similar to previous subsections, we characterize the maximal cartel price pL as a
function of δ ∈ (0, 1). Consider the cartel price p ∈ (pN , pM ], then for δ ≥ ∆(p) ∈ (0, 1) this
cartel price can be sustained by a strategy profile in which the cartel operates silently, and
for δ ≥ Φ (p) ∈ (0, 1) the same cartel price can be sustained by a strategy profile in which
the cartel systematically colludes and reports. Hence, the lowest threshold on δ suffices to
sustain p. Formally, for any cartel price p ∈ (pN , pM ] and any δ ≥ min {∆(p) ,Φ (p)} ∈ (0, 1)
there exists at least one strategy profile supporting p. Inverting this minimum function
min {∆(p) ,Φ (p)} yields pL = max {∆−1 (δ) ,Φ−1 (δ)}. We have the following result.
Proposition 15 Under antitrust regulation with a leniency program, the maximal cartel
price pL is non-decreasing in δ ∈ (0, 1), and
pL = pN , if δ ∈ (0,min{∆ (pN) ,Φ (pN)}),
pL ∈ [pN , pM), if δ ∈ [min{∆ (pN) ,Φ (pN)} ,min{∆ (pM) ,Φ (pM)}),
pL = pM , if δ ∈ [min{∆ (pM) ,Φ (pM)} , 1),
where min
{
∆
(
pM
)
,Φ
(
pM
)}
< 1.
To conclude this section, we classify all possible leniency programs applicable for the case
of multiple reporting α (p,R) in the (p, α)-space. In this classification, two issues stand out:
By what strategy profile can we sustain the cartel price p (if sustainable) and whether the
program is exploitable. The first question is answered for a silent strategy profile if p ≤ pA
and a systematic collusion and reporting strategy profile if α (p,R) ≤ 1− 1−δ
λ(p)
, i.e. region A
in Figure 5. The second question requires the following two results.
Lemma 16 The leniency program is exploitable at p ∈ [pN , pM ] if and only if α (p,R) <
1− 1−δ
Λ(p)
. Furthermore, 1− 1−δ
Λ(p)
≤ 1− 1−δ
λ(p)
if and only if p ∈ [pN , pA].
Lemma 17 1 − 1−δ
Λ(p)
≥ 0 is non-decreasing in p and increasing in p if either β′(p) > 0 or
k′(p) > 0. Furthermore, 1− 1−δ
Λ(p)
is increasing in γ, k (p) and β (p) and decreasing in δ.
Combining all results implies that the (p, α)-space is divided by the vertical line p = pA
and the curves 1 − 1−δ
Λ(·) and 1 − 1−δλ(·) that intersect at p = pA and, in case of two partially
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Figure 8: Classification of leniency programs α (·, R).
overlapping horizontal line pieces, intersect at some range of prices p ≤ pA. Figure 8 illus-
trates these curves, and also subdivides the regions A and B in Figure 5 into subregions. We
discuss these cases when p ∈ (pN , pM ] and α (p,R) belong to each of these regions separately:
A1 : Since p ≤ pA and α (p,R) ≤ 1− 1−δλ(p) , both strategy profiles sustain p as an equilibrium
price. Since also α (p,R) ≥ 1− 1
Λ(p)
, the leniency program is not exploitable at p, and
the cartel prefers to operate silently.
A2 : As in A1, both strategy profiles sustain p as an equilibrium price. Since also α (p,R) <
1− 1
Λ(p)
, the leniency program is exploitable at p, and the cartel prefers to systematically
report.
A3 : Since p > p
A and α (p,R) ≤ 1 − 1−δ
λ(p)
, only the systematic collusion and reporting
strategy profile forms an equilibrium. Even though the traditional antitrust policy
would eradicate this cartel price, the leniency program annihilates this positive effect
by enhancing collusion on this cartel price.
B1 : Since p ≤ pA and α (p,R) > 1 − 1−δλ(p) , only the strategy profile in which the cartel
operates silently forms an equilibrium.
B2 : Since p > p
A and α (p,R) > 1− 1−δ
λ(p)
, none of the strategy profiles forms an equilibrium.
Hence, the cartel price p cannot be sustained, firms prefer to deviate, and no cartel
formation takes place.
These results have the following policy implications. Introducing leniency program
α (p,R) in either of the regions A1, B1 or B2 does not change cartel practices, and the
cartel either operates silently to sustain p or does not form at all. However, adverse effects
do arise for α (p,R) in regions A2 and A3 due to the leniency program. In region A2, the
leniency program does not eradicate a previously sustainable cartel price p, but it is ex-
ploitable and might induce systematic reporting. This can be seen as a first type of adverse
effects of (ex-ante) leniency programs. In region A3, introduction of the leniency program
makes it possible to sustain a previously unsustainable cartel price p implying that leniency
programs in this region are harmful. This can be identified as a second type of adverse
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effects. For the class of non-decreasing policy functions α (·, R), regions A2 and A3 can be
avoided by allowing only moderate (or no) fine reductions in case of multiple reporters, i.e.
α
(
pA, R
)
> 1− (1− δ) /λ (pA).
The above discussion implies that introduction of wrongly designed leniency programs
(e.g. leniency programs that give too generous fine reductions α (p,R) to all reporting firms
in case of multiple reporting) can lead to an improvement in cartel stability with higher
prices sustained by the cartel. At the same time, under silently operating cartels, in case
only one firm reports (or first reporter is clearly identified and is treated differently from the
rest), our results of Section 3.2 imply that leniency programs without rewards to a single
reporting firm, i.e. α (p,N), do not have any impact on the range of sustainable cartel prices.
We will extend our analysis to the discussion of rewards α (p,N) < 0 in the next section.
Finally, we discuss a combination of a tougher antitrust policy and substantial fine re-
ductions in the leniency program. According to Figure 8, this reduces pS = pA since such a
policy change shifts the curve 1 − 1−δ
Λ(·) upwards, and simultaneously, expands the combined
region of A2 and A3 enhancing adverse effects that might increase p
R. These opposite effects
have an ambiguous effect on the maximal cartel price. The largest reduction of the maximal
cartel price is achieved if the new fine reductions are moderate for multiple self-reporting
firms, i.e. the new curve α (·, R) is confined to the new regions A1, B1 and B2. Otherwise,
the reduction in this price is less (and could even be an increase), and the model predicts
pL = pR > pA > pN supported by systematic collusion and reporting in the new situation.
Reporting should therefore not be taken as evidence that the cartel dissolves.
4 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the consequences of relaxing some of the assumptions imposed
in Section 2. These concern rewards for a single reporting firm, profit maximization by the
cartel, limited access to leniency for repeated offenders and punishing a price-deviating firm.
Each topic is discussed in a separate subsection.
4.1 Rewards for Single Reporting Firms
Spagnolo (2004) and Rey (2003) proposed an alternative point of view that in order to
fully eradicate cartels, leniency programs should offer sufficiently large rewards to reporting
firms. Our analysis can be modified to characterize the effective reward needed to upset
cartel prices sustainable under traditional antitrust regulation. We confirm the insights in
Spagnolo (2004) and Rey (2003) and extend it to our general setting.
Consider a silent cartel, the leniency program is effective to upset the cartel price p ∈(
pN , pA
]
, i.e. Λ(p) ≤ λ(p), if and only if (9) fails at p ∈ (pN , pA]. Accordingly,
1
1− α(p,N) < Λ(p) ≤ λ(p)⇐⇒ α (p,N) < 1−
1
Λ(p)
≤ 1− 1
λ(p)
≤ 0. (16)
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The smallest upper bound on α (p,N) in (16) has several important implications. First,
independent of the policy functions β (p) and k (p) and the sector characteristics λ (p), δ
and γ, the leniency program can only be effective if the first reporting firm is substantially
rewarded as α (p,N) < 0. This result is quite intuitive. Since a firm’s future expected cartel
profit is positive (i.e. higher than its competitive profits), this firm can only be induced to
report if it will be compensated for foregoing its positive future expected profit. Second, the
upper bound 1 − 1
Λ(p)
is the minimal effective reward to break the silence at cartel price p,
which is non-decreasing in p. After substituting (3) into (16), we obtain
α(p,N) <
β (p) k (p)− δ [1− γβ (p)]
1− δ [1− γβ (p)] . (17)
In Rey (2003), it is shown that such reward is unbounded if δ goes to 1. Taking this limit
evaluated at arbitrary p ∈ (pN , pM ] shows that this limit is bounded for all γ > 0 and that
it is only unbounded for the boundary case γ = 0, which is the case analyzed in Rey (2003).
The fact that cartels that set higher prices arouse more suspicions makes them more
vulnerable to be uncovered. This implies a positive effect on the expected penalty and a
negative effect on the expected time of enjoying the benefits from the cartel before the first
conviction. Lower expected net benefits makes coming forward less costly and, require lower
minimal effective rewards. So, the presence of suspicions has a dampening effect on the
minimal effective reward. Cartels that set low prices, and by doing so arouse less suspicions,
are the most costly to eradicate. We now summarize our main findings:
Proposition 18 There exists a non-decreasing (ex-ante) leniency program with rewards for
single reporting firms that satisfies (17) for all p ∈ (pN , pA]. This program eradicates all cartel
prices in (pN , pA], which could otherwise be sustained under traditional antitrust enforcement.
The leniency program in Proposition 18 prevents cartel formation even when the expected
fines are too low and not sufficient to prevent cartel formation, i.e. β(p)k(p) < 1. This reward
scheme should only be allowed for single reporting firms, or for the strictly-first reporter.
Based on this discussion and the discussion in Section 3.4, we stress that the issue of
single versus multiple reporting firms (or issue of different treatments for the first reporter
and the other reporting firms) is particularly important when discussing the effects of leniency
programs. Moreover, our results provide partial support for the leniency programs present
in OECD countries, where leniency programs allow for large differences between the amount
of fine reduction available for the first reporting firm (up to full amnesty) and much smaller
or no reductions for further reporters.
Proposition 18, however, should not be understood as advocating leniency programs with
rewards, since that would require a welfare analysis and also neglects the issue of exploitable
leniency programs. The latter is important, because individual reduced fines for multiple
reporting firms, i.e. α (p,R), may depend upon the reward for the strictly first reporting firm,
i.e. α (p,N). In case the reward is too generous, i.e. too negative, it may push α (p,R) below
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the condition characterizing region B in Figure 5. For example, Spagnolo (2004) considers
α (p,R) = 1
n
α (p,N) + n−1
n
k (p) and combined with region B implies α (p,N) > n(1 −
1−δ
λ(p)
)− (n− 1) k (p), which is non-increasing in p. The minimal effective reward reduces the
maximal cartel price and avoids adverse effects if and only if p > pER, where pER ∈ [pN , pM]
is the largest intersection point such that n
(
1− 1−δ
λ(p)
)
− (n− 1) k (p) = 1− 1
Λ(p)
.11 Without
adding more structure, we cannot answer whether pER < pA. In general, the moderate
individual fine reductions in case of multiple reporting firms allow for some slack in rewarding
single reporting firms that might be used to implement such rewards without adverse effects.
Currently, the ex-ante leniency programs in some EC countries have a reduced fine for the
second reporter and the US system does not. Therefore, the EC system has less slack than
the US system in implementing minimal effective rewards.
4.2 Profit-Maximizing Cartels
The maximal cartel price for the entire class of grim-trigger strategy profiles may differ from
the standard profit-maximizing cartel price for the same class of strategy profiles. We argue,
however, that our approach is complementary to profit maximization, and is also convenient
in circumventing technicalities involved with profit maximization.
A profit maximizing cartel always chooses the strategy profile supporting cartel price
p ∈ (pN , pM ] that yields the highest profit in case multiple profiles support such price. So,
the cartel’s profit function is equal to
max
{
V (p) ,
1− α (p,R)
1− δ pi (p)
}
, (18)
which is continuous on p ∈ (pN , pM ]. Substitution of (18) for the objective function p in
Program (15) yields profit maximization, and this implies a different objective under the
same equilibrium conditions. Therefore, the profit-maximizing cartel price is at most pL.
In other words, the socially worst outcome pL puts an upper bound on welfare losses to
consumers due to, for instance, profit-maximizing behavior.
In case (18) is monotonically non-decreasing, the profit-maximizing cartel price is the
boundary solution pL of Section 3. Since pi (p) is non-decreasing in p ∈ (pN , pM ], this applies
to the benchmark case, and to most of the literature where all policy functions are assumed
to be constant. The profit function (18), however, may fail monotonicity of either V (p)
and 1−α(p,R)
1−δ pi (p). The product form of V (p) might also destroy concavity, as Example 19
below illustrates. So, maximization of V (p) would also require investigation of second-order
conditions. Similar considerations about concavity apply for 1−α(p,R)
1−δ pi (p).
Since the maximal cartel price does not involve the above technical difficulties it is there-
fore a more convenient approach. Moreover, whenever the profit-maximizing price is a bound-
ary solution, it coincides with pL. So, the maximal cartel price and the profit-maximizing
cartel price are complementary to each other. We provide with an illustrating example.
11Similar as before, pER is the largest intersection point of a non-increasing and a non-decreasing curve
with the same caveats of Section 3.1 about existence.
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Figure 9: The profit-maximizing cartel price under traditional antitrust regulation.
Example 19 In this example, we consider profit maximization under traditional antitrust
policy in the homogeneous Bertrand oligopoly of Example 5. By (1), V (p) = 1−βkp
1−δ(1−γβp) · (2−p)pn
fails both monotonicity and concavity on
[
pN , pM
]
.12 The function is single peaked. For
parameter values k = 3, β = 1
6
and γ = 2
3
, neglecting the equilibrium conditions as in
Harrington (2005), MAPLE obtains from ∂V (p) /∂p = 0 the profit-maximizing cartel price
−27 (1− δ) + 3√65δ2 − 146δ + 81
4δ
∈ [0, 3
4
)
for all δ ∈ [0, 1]. The profit-maximizing cartel price is decreasing in δ ∈ [0, 1]. Introducing
the equilibrium conditions implies that the profit-maximizing cartel price is the minimum of
the above expression and pA, i.e. the solid curve in Figure 9. These two price curves intersect
at δ ≈ .955. So, on the interval [0, 0.955], the profit-maximizing cartel price coincides with
pA, while for the interval (.955, 1] the profit-maximizing cartel price is lower than pA because
of non-binding equilibrium conditions.
This example confirms the assertion in Harrington (2004 and 2005) that the equilibrium
conditions are always non-binding for sufficiently large δ < 1. Our results, however, also show
that the profit-maximizing cartel price is non-monotone in δ on [0, 1] if the equilibrium con-
ditions are taken into account. As δ goes to 1, the profit-maximizing cartel price goes to the
competitive price pN , and the limit profit-maximizing cartel price seriously underestimates
the potential maximal damage to consumers under sustainable cartel behavior.
4.3 Limited Access to Leniency
Many OECD countries do not offer unlimited access to their leniency programs. Restricting
availability of leniency to repeated offenders prevents cartels from systematically colluding
and reporting, see Chen and Rey (2007). In this subsection, we analyze the impact of
limited access to leniency when the cartel would otherwise exploit leniency by systematically
12Without going into details, for δ close to 1 it holds that ∂V (p) /∂p > 0 for p close to 0, while ∂V (p) /∂p <
0 for p close to 1. For parameter values k = 3, β = 16 , γ =
2
3 and δ = .99, software package MAPLE returns
the inflexion point p = 0.64433 ∈ [pN , pM ] when solving ∂2V (p) /∂p2 = 0.
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colluding and reporting, i.e. when pA < pR < pM . In particular, we examine when “collude
and report as long as leniency applies and then collude silently” is effective to support the
maximal cartel price. We show that the leniency program that blocks repeated offenders
and only allows first-time offenders to apply, which is the program considered in Chen and
Rey (2007), is optimal within the class of leniency programs with limited access.
Consider the situation where cartel members may only apply for leniency a finite number
of times, where this number represents the maximum number of convictions and each con-
viction reduces the number left for all firms by one. After the leniency program is exhausted,
the continuation game is equivalent to that of Section 3.1 where no leniency is offered. Based
on our analysis in Section 3.1 and 3.2, the maximal cartel price is pA and it is sustained by a
“collude and never report” strategy profile. From Section 3.1 it follows that pA < pR < pM
implies
V
(
pA
)
=
1− β (p) k (pA)
1− δ [1− γβ (pA)]pi
(
pA
)
= piopt
(
pA
)
.
In a period where the firms may still apply for leniency one more time, the cartel has
two options, either always collude and never report or collude and report in the current
period followed by colluding silently. The first option enables them to sustain any cartel
price p ≤ pA in every period as in Section 3.2. In the second option, each firm’s profit is
[1− α(p,R)] pi (p) + δV (pA), where p ∈ [pN , pM] is the cartel price in the current period.
Price p ∈ [pN , pM] can be supported if and only if piopt(p) ≤ [1− α(p,R)]pi (p) + δV (pA),
which can be rewritten as
1− α (p,R)
1− δ pi (p)− pi
opt (p) ≥ δ
1− δ
[
piopt (p)− V (pA)] . (19)
When pA < pR < pM , (11) evaluated at p = pA implies that the left-hand side of (19) is
non-negative. Then also, piopt
(
pA
)
= V
(
pA
)
implies that the right-hand side of (19) is equal
to 0 at p = pA. Therefore, (19) holds at p = pA, and hence we must have p1 ≥ pA, where
p1 is the maximal cartel price where (19) holds. When pA < pR < pM , however, p1 = pA is
impossible. To see this, note that the leniency program is exploitable at price p = pA, and,
by its definition, we have
piopt(pA) = V
(
pA
)
< (1− δ)
[
1− α(pA, R)
1− δ pi
(
pA
)]
+ δV
(
pA
)
.
This implies that (19) has a slack at p = pA, and by continuity in p, this condition still
holds for all p slightly above pA. So, we conclude that p1 > pA. Since piopt (p) is increasing,
the right-hand side of (19) is positive whenever p > pA, and therefore, (19) is at least as
restrictive as (11) for all p ∈ (pA, pM]. When pA < pR < pM , then pR satisfies (11) with an
equal sign, and necessarily, also p1 satisfies (19) with an equality, i.e.
1− α (p1, R)
1− δ pi
(
p1
)− piopt (p1) = δ
1− δ
[
piopt
(
p1
)− V (pA)] > 0.
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From this we conclude that p1 < pR. To summarize, whenever the unlimited leniency program
predicts adverse effects, i.e. pA < pR < pM , limiting access to leniency to just one time
reduces the maximal cartel price to p1 ∈ (pA, pR).
In a period where the firms may still apply for leniency for two more times, the firms have
three options, the two options discussed before or collude and exhaust the leniency program
within two periods followed by always collude and never report. The first two options do
not exhaust the leniency program, but nevertheless enable the firms to sustain either silent
collusion on pA as in Section 3.2, or collude and report on p1 > pA in the current period
followed by silent collusion on pA as in Section 3.2. Then in the third option, setting cartel
price p ∈ [pN , pM] in the current period followed by collude and report on p1 in the next
period and then pA as in Section 3.1, each firm’s profit is [1− α(p,R)]pi (p) + δV¯ (p1, pA),
where V¯
(
p1, pA
)
> V
(
pA
)
denotes [1− α(p1)]pi (p1)+ δV (pA).13 Price p ∈ [pN , pM] can be
supported in the current period if and only if piopt(p) ≤ [1− α(p,R)] pi (p)+ δV¯ (p1, pA), and
similar as before, implies
1− α (p,R)
1− δ pi (p)− pi
opt (p) ≥ δ
1− δ
[
piopt (p)− V¯ (p1, pA)] . (20)
Condition (19) evaluated at p = p1 implies that the left-hand side of (19), which is also the
left-hand side of (20), is at least δ
1−δ
[
piopt (p1)− V (pA)] and this expression is larger than the
right-hand side of (20) evaluated at p = p1. Therefore, p = p1 can be sustained, and hence
we must have p2 ≥ p1, where p2 is the maximal cartel price where (20) holds. Moreover, (20)
has a slack at p = p1, and by continuity in p, this condition holds for all p slightly above p1.
So, we can conclude that p2 > p1 > pA. Similar as for p1, when pA < pR < pM the maximal
cartel price p2 is found at
1− α (p1, R)
1− δ pi
(
p2
)− piopt (p2) = δ
1− δ
[
piopt
(
p2
)− V¯ (p1, pA)] > 0.
This implies p2 ∈ (p1, pR), and[
1− α(p2)]pi (p2)+ δV¯ (p1, pA) = piopt(p2) > piopt(p1) = V¯ (p1, pA) .
To summarize, whenever the unlimited leniency program predicts adverse effects, i.e. pA <
pR < pM , limiting access to leniency to two times will yield the sequence of decreasing
maximal cartel prices p2 > p1 > pA where p2 ∈ (pA, pR).
The arguments for p1 and p2 can be repeated up to any finite number representing the
maximum of times a cartel may apply for leniency. In principle, this only requires to redefine
the value function on the right-hand side of (20). Doing so yields a finite sequence of de-
creasing maximal cartel prices above pA followed by silent collusion. In case the law dictates
13By piopt (p) is increasing and the equilibrium conditions for p1 and pA, we have
V¯
(
p1, pA
)
=
[
1− α(p1)]pi (p1)+ δV (pA) ≥ piopt(p1) > piopt(pA) = V (pA) .
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the presence of a leniency program, the consumers’ best of these sequences of maximal cartel
prices is the shortest: meaning p1 is sustained once, followed by silent collusion.
These results offer positive support for leniency programs in those OECD countries that
allow for fine reductions to first-time offenders only. Limiting access to leniency for repeated
offenders has two positive effects: First, it minimizes the length of time firms can exploit
adverse effects in the form of ”collude and report” strategies, and second, it minimizes
the maximal cartel price sustainable under adverse effects. These results show that the
exogenously given leniency program offered to first-time offenders only, as in e.g. Chen and
Rey (2007), is optimal. In that respect, our interpretation of the effects of limited access
to leniency as positive differs from the negative conclusion in Chen and Rey (2007), who
measure the effectiveness of restricted access solely by its ability to eradicate cartels.
4.4 Prosecution of Price-Deviating Firms
Spagnolo (2004) and Rey (2003) argue that antitrust enforcement would be most effective if
the incentives for price deviations are maximal and this requires that price-deviating firms
are never prosecuted, as analyzed in Section 3. In this section, we assume price-deviating
firms can be prosecuted and extend our analysis of Section 3.
Consider traditional antitrust regulation first. Let (pi, p) be a history in which firm i
deviated in prices in the current period, β (pi, p) ≥ 0 be the cartel’s detection probability
after firm i’s unilateral deviation, and k (pi, p)pi (pi, p) ≥ 0 be firm i’s fine. For pi = p we
impose β (p, p) = β (p) and k (p, p) = k (p). Firm i’s expected profit from price deviation pi
is equal to pi (pi, p) [1− β (pi, p) k (pi, p)], and firm i’s optimal price deviation solves
max
pi∈[pN ,pM ]
pi (pi, p) [1− β (pi, p) k (pi, p)] ≤ max
pi∈[pN ,pM ]
pi (pi, p) = pi
opt (p) . (21)
Define λβ (p) as the relative size of the net cartel profit to the net gains under the best
unilateral deviation, i.e.
λβ(p) =
pi (p)
maxpi∈[pN ,pM ] pi (pi, p) [1− β (pi, p) k (pi, p)]
≥ λ (p) , (22)
which is continuous in p ∈ (pN , pM]. For explanatory reasons, we assume λβ (·) is non-
increasing. More importantly, when β (pi, p) k (pi, p) > 0 for all p ∈
(
pN , pM
]
, the main
difference with Section 3.1 is that λβ(·) can be regarded as an upward shift of λ (·) in Figure
1. Then, replicating the analysis of Section 3.1 implies condition (3) becomes λβ(p) ≥ Λ(p),
and it sustains a non-empty subinterval of cartel prices
[
pN , pAβ
]
, where pAβ ≥ pA is the
largest intersection point of λβ(p) ≥ Λ(p). Obviously, β (pi, p) k (pi, p) = 0 for all pi, p ∈(
pN , pM
]
and pi 6= p, suffices to obtain pAβ = pA. In words, the lowest maximal cartel price
sustainable under traditional antitrust regulation is pA and it can be attained by granting
single price-deviating firms full immunity, i.e. β (pi, p) k (pi, p) = 0. This confirms the
insights of Spagnolo (2004) and Rey (2003) and extends these to our general setting.
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Next, consider a leniency program for a single reporting firm under the class of silent
strategy profiles of Section 3.2 that also specify that firms remain silent even after a price
deviation (pi, p).
14,15 For any history (pi, p), α (pi, p, N) ≥ 0 denotes price-deviating firm i’s
reduced fine after reporting with α (p, p,N) = α (p,N). Firm i’s expected profit from the
price deviation pi is equal to pi (pi, p) [1− α (pi, p, N)], and firm i’s optimal price deviation
solves maxpi∈[pN ,pM ] pi (pi, p) [1− α (pi, p,N)] ≤ piopt (p). Define λα (p) as the relative size of
the net cartel profit to the net gains under the best unilateral deviation, i.e.
λα(p) =
pi (p)
maxpi∈[pN ,pM ] pi (pi, p) [1− α (pi, p, N)]
≥ λ (p) . (23)
Duplication of the arguments for λβ (·) yields that λα(·) is an upward shift of λ (·) in Figure
1 with intersection point pSα ≥ pA and
[
pN , pSα
]
as the range of sustainable cartel prices.
Moreover, setting α (pi, p) = 0 for all pi, p ∈
(
pN , pM
]
and pi 6= p suffices to obtain pSα = pA.
The implication for silently operating cartels is that Program (10) needs to be modified
such that λ (p) ≥ Λ (p) is replaced by both λβ(p) ≥ Λ(p) and λα(p) ≥ Λ(p). Hence, pS =
min
{
pAβ , p
S
α, p˜
} ≥ pA. Whenever 0 ≤ α (pi, p, N) < β (pi, p) k (pi, p) for all pi, p ∈ (pN , pM]
and pi 6= p, the curve λα(·) lies between λ (·) and λβ (·) and we obtain pA ≤ pSα < pAβ .
This implies that if the leniency program offers sufficiently generous fine reductions to a
price-deviating firm in case it is the single (or strictly the first) reporting firm, then such
firm is induced to seek protection from fines. So, introducing leniency helps in reducing
the maximal cartel price from pAβ to p
S
α. However, no (ex-ante) leniency program without
rewards can ever obtain a maximal cartel price below pA.
Most importantly, in case the traditional antitrust policy does not minimize the maximal
cartel price, i.e. β (pi, p) k (pi, p) > 0 for all pi, p ∈
(
pN , pM
]
, the introduction of the ex-
ante leniency program that grants a single price-deviating firm that reports full amnesty,
i.e. α (pi, p, N) = 0 for all pi, p ∈
(
pN , pM
]
, is an improvement, since it allows to attain the
lowest maximal cartel price under silent strategy profiles, i.e. pS = pSα = p
A. This again
confirms the insights of Spagnolo (2004) and Rey (2003).
In summary, we confirm and extend two perspectives brought forward by Spagnolo (2004):
First, the incentives for price deviations are maximal if the leniency program does not prose-
cute price-deviating firms, and therefore such firms should be exempted from fines. Second,
in case the traditional regulation does prosecute price-deviating firms, then the leniency pro-
gram might induce such firms to report in order to protect themselves from expected fines,
if the latter are high while the reduced fines for the single reporting firm are low.
We forego a detailed analysis of the highest cartel price under systematic collusion and
reporting, denoted as pRα . In essence, α (p,R) should also be extended to α (pi, p, R), λ (p)
has to be modified similar to (23), and then straightforward modification of (11) follows.
Since this is also an upward shift of the curve λ (·), this yields pRα ≥ pR. Consequently,
14We only consider the perspective of a price-deviating firm in order to minimize the discussion.
15Alternatively, the silent cartel agreement may specify that all firms report after a price deviation, i.e. a
race to report. We forego analyzing such strategy profiles, because the analysis and conclusions would be
similar after substituting α (pi, p,N) by i’s reduced fine for this case, which is α (pi, p, R) as defined below.
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modifying the analysis in Section 3.4 would yield pL = max
{
pS, pRα
}
and, therefore, pL ≥
min
{
pAβ , p
S
α
} ≥ pA, which demonstrates that the negative result of Section 3.4 persists.
These results provide important support for the leniency programs present in OECD
countries, where price-deviating firms are prosecuted and the single reporting firm is granted
full immunity: Introducing such leniency program reduces the maximal cartel price set by
a silent cartel from pAβ to p
R. If the design of leniency programs avoids the adverse effects
discussed in Section 3.3 and 3.4, then (ex-ante) leniency programs have a non-increasing
effect on the number of cartels and reduce the maximal damage to consumers compared to
the situation prior to the leniency program. Remaining cartels operate silently. Furthermore,
a properly-designed leniency program should allow fine reductions only for the first reporting
firm, like in the US. In case leniency programs are wrongly designed (which seems the case
if multiple reporting firms can obtain substantial fine reductions, like in some EU countries)
cartels will switch from operating silently to systematically colluding and reporting. Then
an increase in reporting after introducing a leniency program is a negative phenomenon.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, the maximal cartel price in an infinitely-repeated sequential game with two-
stages is studied as a proxy for both the set of sustainable cartel prices, and consumers’ worst-
case scenario of maximal damage. This allows for the simultaneous analysis of two important
decisions firms face in the presence of leniency programs: The decision to deviate from the
cartel price, and the decision to report to the AA. We show that the maximal cartel price is
the maximum of two other prices: The maximal cartel price sustained by cartels that operate
silently and the price sustained by cartels that systematically collude and report. This
characterization disentangles the effects of traditional antitrust policies, leniency programs,
and behavioral assumptions into three separate effects, which are studied in Sections 3.1, 3.2
and 3.3 before being combined in Section 3.4. Each of these maximal cartel prices, and as
a result the effectiveness of antitrust regulation and leniency programs, depends upon the
prevailing policies and the sector characteristics, such as the sector structure, the type of
competition, the sector’s cartel culture, and the discount factor. Furthermore, the effects of
leniency in Section 3.2 are positive in nature, because these concern incentives to break the
cartel, whereas the effects of leniency in Section 3.3 are adverse since the maximal cartel
price increases and systematic reporting becomes a part of the collusive cartel strategy.
We provide policy recommendations on how to improve the design of antitrust policy and
ex-ante leniency, how to eliminate adverse effects, and what is necessary to prevent cartel
formation in the first place: 1) Price-deviating firms should not be prosecuted in order to
give firms maximal incentives for price deviations. 2) The design of leniency programs should
avoid adverse effects since these raise the maximal cartel price, and therefore increase the
maximal damage to consumers. 3) Individual fine reductions in case of multiple reporting
firms should be moderate in order to obey the necessary and sufficient conditions under
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which adverse effects are eliminated. Based on Section 3.4, it seems that the current ex-ante
leniency programs in most EC countries could be improved by abolishing the reduced fine
for the second reporting firm, similar to the current US system. The analysis in Section 4.3
implies that leniency should be offered to first-time offenders only. Our results offer positive
support for the policies currently employed in OECD countries that prosecute price-deviating
firms while simultaneously granting full immunity to single reporting firms, and policies that
restrict leniency for repeated offenders to first-time offenders only. Whether these OECD
leniency programs also avoid adverse effects is left as an empirical question.
Effective ex-ante leniency programs that eradicate all cartel prices always exist in theory.
Such leniency programs, however, necessarily involve rewards to the single reporting firm (or
strictly the first reporting firm). Such rewards might introduce adverse effects. The condi-
tions that avoid adverse effects seem to allow for some slack in rewarding single reporting
firms, but we leave it to future research in how far the minimum effective reward can be
implemented without adverse effects to eradicate the most damaging prices.
We stress that our results are robust. First of all, our results hold for general oligopoly
models and general policy functions. Furthermore, since there is a substantial class of
oligopoly models in which the profit-maximizing cartel price coincides with the maximal
cartel price, our results complement the cartel profit-maximization approach for this class.
Most important is the robustness with respect to relaxing the assumption never to prosecute
price-deviating firms, which is discussed above.
Our focus is on general policy functions for a methodological reason. In future research,
the optimal design of traditional antitrust and leniency programs remains to be an important
research issue. Studying the optimal design requires a well-defined framework for analyzing
the effects of changes in antitrust policies and leniency programs on consumers’ welfare.
Such changes can be thought of as shaping the policy functions and, ideally, one would like
a flexible and large class of such policy functions that are a priori neither constant or linear.
Our framework allows for such a rich class of potential policy functions and a characterization
of the maximal cartel price related to the equilibrium conditions. Future research will verify
whether the currently popular fixed detection probabilities and fixed fines are indeed the
optimal policies within the class of policy functions we consider.
As mentioned in the introduction, Spagnolo (2008) questions whether the observed in-
creases in cartel detection are the result of unobserved increases in cartel activity or are the
result of improved effectiveness of leniency programs. Based on our results we are able to ad-
dress this issue. For wrongly designed leniency programs introducing such program implies
that cartels switch from operating silently to systematically colluding and reporting, and
also the maximal cartel price increases. Then, the observed increase in reporting in many
OECD countries should be viewed as a negative phenomenon. If the leniency program is
properly designed, i.e. it avoids adverse effects and grants full immunity to single reporting
firms, then our model cannot explain the observed increase in reporting, but it excludes an
unobserved increase in cartel activity as a possible explanation. Moreover, if such properly
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designed leniency program is accompanied by tougher traditional antitrust regulation, than
the maximal cartel price will be reduced due to such policy change.
6 Appendix with Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Taking derivative of Λ(p) with respect to p, we have
dΛ(p)
dp
=
δγβ′ (p) [1− β (p) k(p)] + [β′ (p) k(p) + β (p) k′(p)] [1− δ (1− γβ (p))]
[1− β (p) k(p)]2 ≥ 0,
due to the assumptions on β (p) and k(p). In addition, when either β′(p) > 0 or k′(p) > 0,
the above inequality is strict. Next, βˆ (p) > β (p) implies
[(1− δ) k (p) + γδ][βˆ (p)− β (p)] > 0⇐⇒ 1− δ[1− γβˆ (p)]
1− βˆ (p) k (p) >
1− δ [1− γβ (p)]
1− β (p) k (p) .
The effects of γ, δ and k (p) are obvious. ¤
Proof of Lemma 2. Since λ(p), β (p), and k (p) are all continuous in p ∈ (pN , pM ], so is
∆(p). Taking the derivative of ∆(p) with respect to p, we have
d∆(p)
dp
=
−λ′(p) [1− β (p) k (p)] + λ(p) [β′ (p) k (p) + β (p) k′ (p)]
1− γβ (p) +∆(p)
γβ′ (p)
1− γβ (p) ≥ 0
due to λ′(p) ≤ 0, β′ (p) ≥ 0 and k′ (p) ≥ 0. Note also that
∆(p) ≡ 1− λ(p) [1− β (p) k (p)]
1− γβ (p) ≥ 1− λ(p) [1− β (p) k (p)] ≥ 1− λ(p).
The last inequality is strict when β (p) > 0. Next, βˆ (p) > β (p) implies
[γ (1− λ (p))+λ (p)][βˆ (p)−β (p)] > 0⇐⇒ 1− λ(p)[1− βˆ (p) k (p)]
1− γβˆ (p) >
1− λ(p) [1− β (p) k (p)]
1− γβ (p)
The effect of k (p) is obvious. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3. Lemma 1 and monotonicity of λ(p) imply that pA is non-
decreasing in δ and non-increasing in γ. Note that ∆(pN) = 0 and limε→0+ ∆(pN+ε) = 1−λ.
When δ ∈ (0, 1− λ), (3) fails for all p ∈ (pN , pM ] and, hence, pA = pN . For ∆(pM) ≤ δ < 1,
(3) holds at p = pM and, hence, pA = pM . Otherwise, we have pA ∈ [pN , pM). ¤
Proof of Lemma 9. Since λ(p), and α (p,R) are continuous in p ∈ (pN , pM ], so is Φ(p).
Next, α (p,R) ≥ 0 implies Φ(p) ≡ 1− λ (p) [1− α (p,R)] ≥ 1− λ(p).
The last inequality is strict when α (p,R) > 0. Taking the derivative of Φ(p) with respect
to p, we have dΦ(p)
dp
= −λ′(p) [1− α (p,R)] + λ(p)α′ (p, 1) ≥ 0, due to λ′(p) ≤ 0, α (p,R) ≥ 0,
and α′ (p, 1) ≥ 0. Finally, the effect of α (p,R) is obvious. ¤
Proof of Proposition 10. Observe that 1−δ
1−α(·,1) is decreasing in δ ∈ (0, 1) and increasing δ
will relax (11). Hence, pR is non-decreasing in δ. Substitution of Φ (p) for ∆ (p) in the proof of
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Proposition 3 yields the results for each interval of δ. Finally, λ (p) < 1 and 0 ≤ α (p,R) < 1
for all p ∈ (pN , pM ] imply Φ (p) = 1− λ (p) [1− α (p,R)] < 1. So Φ (pM) < 1. ¤
Proof of Lemma 11. Note that 1 − 1−δ
λ(p)
responds similar to p as λ (p), and the latter
is non-increasing or increasing in p. Next, since λ ≤ 1 we have that limε→0 1 − 1−δλ(pN+ε) =
1 − 1−δ
λ
≤ δ. Finally, 1 − 1−δ
λ(p)
≥ 0 ⇐⇒ δ ≥ 1 − λ(p), which is the constraint of Program
(5) ⇐⇒ p ∈ [pN , pC]. ¤
Proof of Proposition 14. Note that pL > pA if and only if pR > pA if and only if either
one of the following two distinct cases holds:
1. The curve Λ (·) at p = pA lies above the curve 1−δ
1−α(·,R) at p = p
A (the case illustrated
by Figure 7). This case is equivalent to α
(
pA, R
)
< 1− 1−δ
λ(pA)
.
2. α
(
pA, R
) ≥ 1 − 1−δ
λ(pA)
. Then, we must have α
(
pA, R
)
= 1 − 1−δ
λ(pA)
= 1 − 1−δ
Λ(pA)
, where
the latter equality holds by definition of pA, and > instead of = would imply pR < pA,
which contradicts that we derive conditions for pR > pA. Next, the continuous and weakly
monotonic functions λ (·) and Λ (·) cannot be both constant on [pA, pA+ ε1] for some ε1 > 0,
because then we obtain the contradiction that pA = maxp {p : λ (p) ≥ Λ (p)} ≥ pA+ε1 > pA.
So, λ (p) < Λ (p) for all p > pA. Furthermore, both the continuous functions λ (·) and
1−δ
1−α(·,R) cannot be monotonic (i.e. not constant) on [p
A, pA + ε2] for all ε2 > 0, because then
1−δ
1−α(p,R) > λ (p) for all p > p
A and, hence, pR ≤ pA, which again contradicts that we derive
conditions for pR > pA. So, for some ε2 > 0 we must have that both λ (·) and 1−δ1−α(·,R) are
constant on [pA, pA + ε2]. Since λ (·) is constant while we already concluded that λ (·) and
Λ (·) cannot be both constant for p > pA and, in particular for p ∈ [pA, pA + ε2], it follows
that for some ε¯ ∈ (0, ε2) the continuous function Λ (·) is increasing on [pA, pA + ε¯]. ¤
Proof of Proposition 15. By Proposition 3 and 10, both ∆ (p) and Φ (p) are non-
decreasing in δ ∈ (0, 1) and, therefore, min {∆(p) ,Φ (p)} is also non-decreasing δ. There-
fore, pL is non-decreasing in δ ∈ (0, 1). Substitution of min {∆(p) ,Φ (p)} for ∆ (p) in the
proof of Proposition 3 yields the results for each interval of δ. Finally, by Proposition 10,
min
{
∆
(
pM
)
,Φ
(
pM
)} ≤ Φ (pM) < 1. ¤
Proof of Lemma 16 + 17. All results follow immediately from Lemma 1 after ob-
serving that 1 − 1−δ
Λ
responds similar to changes in variables and parameters as Λ. Next,
1−α(p,R)
1−δ pi (p) > V (p) =
pi(p)
Λ(p)
if and only if α (p,R) < 1− 1−δ
Λ(p)
. By definition of pA, p ∈ [pN , pA]
if and only if λ (p) ≥ Λ (p). The latter is equivalent to 1 − 1−δ
Λ(p)
≤ 1 − 1−δ
λ(p)
. Finally, from
Section 3.1, Λ(pN) = 1 − δ. Then, 1 − 1−δ
Λ(pN )
= 0. Combined with 1 − 1−δ
Λ(p)
non-decreasing
ensures non-negativity. ¤
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